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12007/08 MARKS MY thirtieth year of law teaching. 
My colleagues suggested that I write a paper describ-
ing how I teach, explaining the techniques and 
practices that contribute to what success I have had in 
the classroom. Some parts of the paper have been 
hard to write; other parts have been easy. I realized I 
hadn’t reflected on how I teach for a long time. I just 
do it. Years ago I read a book by Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi entitled “Flow, The Psychology of 
Optimal Experience.”1 His description of being “in 
the flow” is what I experience when I teach. I am in 
the moment, fully engaged. Csikszentmihalyi writes:
When all a person’s relevant skills are needed to 
cope with the challenges of a situation, that per-
son’s attention is completely absorbed by the 
1 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow, The Psychology of Optimal 
Experience (Harper Perennial 1990).
HOW I TEACH
By Donald H. Zeigler
2activity. . . . People become so involved in what they 
are doing that the activity becomes spontaneous, 
almost automatic; they stop being aware of them-
selves as  separate from the actions they are 
performing. . . . We feel in control of our actions, 
masters of our own fate. On the . . . occasions when 
it happens, we feel a sense of exhilaration, a deep 
sense of enjoyment that is long cherished and that 
becomes a landmark in memory for what life 
should be like.2 
I can’t fully describe how this happens. Being “in the 
flow” in the classroom involves for me many different 
components—painstaking preparation of a specific 
kind, interacting with the students so they feel com-
fortable becoming engaged in the intellectual inquiry, 
challenging the students without threatening them. I 
teach with urgency. I pour out energy. If I don’t appear 
to be caught up in what I am teaching, the students 
are not likely to find it interesting. Energy and enthu-
siasm also implicitly convey the message that the 
enterprise is important. 
I think it best to begin this paper with the parts of 
teaching that are easiest to describe; namely, the 
mechanics of preparation and the many little things 
I do to try to create a professional atmosphere in 
the classroom. After I’ve discussed these essential 
building blocks, I will attempt to describe the 
more subjective, ephemeral, emotional parts of my 
teaching.
2 Id. at 3, 53.
3d
I .  GETTInG STArTEd
I teach Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Federal Courts, 
which are core doctrinal courses. Civil Procedure and 
Evidence usually are large classes with 100 students or 
more. I use the traditional case method. The textbooks 
I assign are filled with court opinions, linked together 
with short introductions and narratives and followed 
by notes and questions. I attempt to create a version of 
the so-called Socratic dialogue. I ask questions about 
the cases, followed by additional leading questions 
designed to guide students in recognizing the impor-
tant points in the cases.3
The first class is important because it sets the tone 
for the semester. I want the students to see immedi-
ately that I am  prepared and well-organized. The 
materials for the course—text book, authors’ annual 
supplement, my syllabus, and any additional supple-
ments I have prepared—are completed and available. 
I tell the students I will begin with administrative, 
housekeeping matters and then spend the balance of 
the class presenting hypotheticals to introduce them 
3 I recognize that there has been much innovation in legal education in 
the last thirty years—the clinical movement, the professionalization 
of legal writing instruction, and the burgeoning use of computers and 
related technology, to mention a few of the main innovations. I 
applaud all of these developments because they have greatly enriched 
the curriculum and enhanced student learning. Students learn in dif-
ferent ways, and different teaching methods help insure that more 
students receive effective instruction. Variety in teaching methods 
also makes law school more interesting. Law school would be intoler-
ably tedious if all professors taught exactly the same way.
4to some of the main themes in the course. I briefly 
discuss the class materials, explain how to read the 
syllabus,4 and give the students the assignment for the 
next class.5 I give them my office hours and my email 
address. I tell the students the exam format and invite 
them later in the semester to view online past essay 
questions and the accompanying “A+” student answers. 
In Civil Procedure, a first-year, first-semester course, I 
also include hints on how to approach law study, how 
to use hornbooks and commercial outlines (as a sup-
plement to, not a substitute for, assigned reading), and 
I ask them to read New York Law School’s “Student 
Conduct: Expectations and Guidelines.” In short, I 
convey necessary information and, hopefully, convey 
the impression that I know what I am doing.
4 Law school textbooks, particularly in required or core doctrinal 
courses, generally provide comprehensive coverage of the subject they 
cover. Inevitably, the texts contain much more material than can rea-
sonably be covered in a three- or four-credit course. The authors hope 
that by being comprehensive more professors will choose the text 
because they all will find the topics they wish to teach in the textbook. 
Professors thus are compelled to pick and choose what to assign. I 
assign relatively few pages, but I expect the students to read those 
pages very carefully. My syllabi are quite detailed, designating the 
cases and the specific notes and questions to be read. I leave out whole 
chapters, and I also leave out individual cases in chapters I do cover 
and many notes and questions following cases that I assign. I tell stu-
dents the syllabus is so long because I’ve left so much out!
5 When the semester gets underway, I give the students the assignments 
for all the classes (usually two) the following week so they can prepare 
over the weekend if they wish to. Night students, in particular, find 
this helpful. I do not include dates on the syllabus, or designate the 
pages we will cover for each class. Although I know from past years 
approximately what I will cover each class, because the class is inter-
active I can’t be sure exactly how far I will get. To designate material 
for each class on the syllabus and then be forced to change the assign-
ment makes a professor look disorganized. 
5I don’t assign case readings for the first class. In 
Civil Procedure I assign an introductory narrative in 
the text about the stages of civil litigation. In upper-
class courses I don’t assign anything at all. In all of 
my classes, I spend the first class  asking questions 
about short hypothetical fact patterns that raise some 
of the main issues or themes of the course. In upper-
class courses students often have not finalized their 
schedules by the first class. They may drop one course 
and add another, so they have not yet bought text-
books. Consequently, if I give an assignment from the 
textbook, a large portion of the class will be unpre-
pared. I believe I have a better chance of engaging the 
whole class with hypotheticals. Particularly in Civil 
Procedure, I make the beginning hypotheticals quite 
easy to encourage students to participate and to ensure 
that they get positive reinforcement. 
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I I .  PrEPArInG fOr Cl ASS
For me, careful and detailed preparation is essential to 
the  success of the enterprise. My preparation materials 
are not  simply “class notes,” in the sense of an outline for 
the day, or a list of points I want to cover, or insights 
about the cases that I want to share with the students. 
My class materials are more focused and specific. I write 
down all of the questions that I plan to ask the students 
about each case. I put the answer to the question in 
parentheses following the question, mainly so I won’t 
6have to puzzle over the answer the next year if I 
forget the answer in the interim. In addition, unless the 
 question is a straightforward factual question—“How 
much money does the plaintiff seek in damages?”— 
I include a list of back-up, leading questions to ask when 
the main question elicits only silence and blank stares. 
I also write the short introductions and transitions from 
one case or section of the text to the next. I call my 
 materials “scripts.” While I’m not expecting the pre-
set, verbatim dialogue of a theatrical presentation, I tend 
to ask the main and back-up questions as I have written 
them, and I hope to evoke answers that are reasonably 
close to the answers I have written.
This sort of detailed preparation has several benefits. 
First, it forces me to decide exactly how I want to 
organize the discussion of each case. I tend to use a fairly 
standard, logical format. What are the facts, what are 
the issues, what does the plaintiff argue on each issue, 
what does the defendant argue, which argument does 
the court accept and why, and then what are the 
implications of the court’s decision? Many court opin-
ions follow this format and many don’t. For those that 
don’t, I often ask questions that will reorganize the 
discussion in the more standard format if I think that 
format will enhance student understanding. This often 
requires saying to the students, “Drawing your attention 
to the second paragraph on page 35,” or “Returning 
now to page 32,” before asking a question. 
A second benefit of this approach is that it requires 
me to read very carefully. Forcing myself to write 
7down the answers to my questions means that I must 
specifically identify the material facts, articulate the 
plaintiff’s arguments, and so on. When I simply read 
through a complicated opinion in an area of my 
expertise, I understand it. I see the main outlines. But 
I often feel like I’m looking at a picture that is a little 
out of focus, at least in some parts. As I write the 
questions and answers for class, the entire picture—
the whole opinion—comes into much clearer focus. 
A third benefit of this approach is that it often 
allows me to have insights into a case that I would 
not have had simply from reading the case over once 
or twice. In the course of writing down the questions 
and answers, I see flaws in logic, gaps in reasoning. 
I see a court distorting precedent or making a major 
doctrinal change seem like a small step. When I see 
these things, I then can write additional questions to 
help the students draw these more sophisticated points 
of analysis from the case. 
Finally, as the students answer the questions, the 
opinion comes into clearer focus for them as well. 
Law students, and particularly first-year law students, 
do not have the knowledge and experience necessary 
to understand court opinions. In addition, they often 
do not read cases carefully. Consequently, students 
often come to class with only the vaguest idea of what 
a case is about or why it is in the text. By being led so 
specifically through the details of a case, including the 
more sophisticated points of analysis, they come away 
with a sense they have learned something. Often, of 
8course, what they learn is that the court has announced 
a fuzzy, ambiguous legal standard that is difficult to 
apply. Students don’t like ambiguity. Most believe 
they came to law school to learn black-letter law. 
Convincing them to embrace uncertainty is not easy. 
But if they at least know a court adopted a new, 
three-factor test, and what those factors are, and 
 specifically how each factor was applied in this case, 
they feel they have something to hold onto. 
I provide an example of a “script” in the Appendix 
(page 39) that helps demonstrate the benefits of the 
detailed preparation I do. I chose a relatively straight-
forward case about personal jurisdiction, a subject 
that most readers may remember from their Civil 
Procedure class or from law practice. The traditional 
rule allowed a state to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant only if the defendant was a resident of 
the state, was present in the state and served with pro-
cess, or consented to jurisdiction. In 1945, International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington6 replaced the rigid traditional 
rule with a new, qualitative,  subjective standard—the 
famous (or infamous) minimum  contacts test. Shoe 
held that a state could exercise jurisdiction over a 
non-resident if the defendant had sufficient contacts 
with the state to make it fair and reasonable to hear 
the case. Shoe gave a green light to the expansion of 
personal jurisdiction, and in the years following many 
states enacted so-called “long-arm” statutes to take 
advantage of the relaxed standards. Early long-arm 
6 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9statutes generally addressed cases where the non-resi-
dent defendant committed a single act or conducted 
only isolated activity in the forum state, but the cause 
of action arose from that activity. 
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp.,7 a 1961 Illinois case, posed one of the vexing 
questions raised by the tort arm of the new long-arm 
statutes. The Illinois statute authorized jurisdiction 
over a non-resident who either in person or through 
an agent commits a tortious act within Illinois. The 
authors of the statute presumably had in mind a case 
where someone physically present in the state commit-
ted a tort, as when a non-resident motorist drove into 
Illinois and had an accident involving the automobile. 
Gray posed a somewhat  different situation. Titan Valve, 
an Ohio company, manufactured a safety valve that it 
sent to American Radiator in Pennsylvania. American 
Radiator incorporated the valve into a water heater 
that it sent in the course of commerce to Illinois. 
Phyllis Gray bought the water heater in Illinois and it 
exploded, causing her injury. Titan Valve was named 
as a defendant and moved to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction. The trial court granted the motion and Gray 
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Q&A I wrote for the case initially follows the 
standard format. I ask questions to bring out the facts 
and procedural details, the key language of the long-
arm statute, and the two issues that, kindly, the court 
explicitly states—whether Titan committed a tortious 
7 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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act within the state within the meaning of the statute 
and whether the statute, if so construed, would vio-
late due process. I ask “What does Titan contend on 
the first issue?” (Titan contends that the tortious act 
occurred in Ohio, where the valve was negligently 
manufactured, rather than in Illinois, where the injury 
occurred.) I ask “What does the court hold on issue 
No. 1, and why?” (The court holds that the tortious 
act occurred in Illinois because without an injury 
there is no tortious act. The court also infers that the 
tort occurred in Illinois because the statute of limita-
tions runs from the time of the injury.) As to issue 
No. 2, the court does not explain the defendant’s 
argument that exercising jurisdiction would deny it 
due process, so I have the students explain, using 
back-up questions designed to focus on Titan’s pau-
city of Illinois contacts. (“What exactly is the extent 
of Titan’s contact with Illinois, according to the proof 
submitted in the case? If you were Titan’s lawyer, how 
would you use International Shoe to argue for dis-
missal?”) Finally, I ask “What does the court hold on 
the constitutional issue and why?” (Jurisdictional 
requirements have been relaxed and jurisdiction is 
secure if the act or transaction itself has some connec-
tion with the forum state.)
At this point the case, and the Q&A, take an unusual 
turn. In the excerpted version of the case in my textbook, 
the court takes two and one-half pages to conduct the 
analysis summarized above and to conclude jurisdic-
tion exists. The court continues to write, however, for 
11
another three pages that seem, at first, to be rambling 
and repetitive. As I pondered the questions I wanted 
to write about these pages, I saw a subtext in the 
opinion that I had not seen just reading the opinion 
through. It became clear the court was very uneasy 
with its analysis in the first half of the opinion, 
although it never said so explicitly. Ultimately, the 
court makes up facts so that it feels more  comfortable 
asserting jurisdiction.
The problems begin when the court discusses 
 precedent, particularly its own prior decision in Nelson 
v. Miller,8 which the court cites as supporting its deci-
sion in Gray. I ask the  student to tell me the facts of 
Nelson. The defendant in that case, a Wisconsin resi-
dent, sold appliances. In the course of delivering a 
stove in Illinois, an employee of the defendant was 
involved in an accident and negligently injured the 
plaintiff. I then ask how Nelson is different from 
Gray, with backup questions that focus on the earlier 
disagreement between the parties in Gray as to where 
the tortious act occurred. (Could the defendant in 
Nelson make the same argument Titan made in Gray 
about the tortious act occurring outside Illinois? 
No, because in Nelson, both the negligent act and the 
con sequences occurred in Illinois, while in Gray the 
negligent manufacture occurred in Ohio, and only the 
injury occurred in Illinois.) Subsequent questions bring 
out that the defendant’s contacts with the forum are 
much greater in Nelson. The defendant in Nelson 
8 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
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purposely availed itself of the benefits and protections 
of the forum in ways Titan did not.
At this point students often begin to look perplexed, 
particularly when I point out that the court nowhere 
acknowledges the important factual differences 
between Nelson and Gray. But I suggest the court is 
nonetheless troubled by the differences. To support this 
suggestion, I specifically direct the students to a para-
graph where the court says the following:
While the record does not disclose the volume of 
Titan’s business or the territory in which appli-
ances incorporating its valves are marketed, it is a 
reasonable inference that its commercial transac-
tions, like those of other manufacturers, result in 
substantial use and consumption in this State. . . . 
[Titan] enjoys benefits from the laws of this State, 
and it has undoubtedly benefited (sic), to a degree, 
from the protection which our law has given to the 
marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves. 
I ask the students what the court is doing, and through 
leading questions bring out that the court is making up 
facts not in the record. I explain that I believe the court 
took this unusual step because it was uneasy asserting 
jurisdiction without additional contacts between Titan 
and Illinois beyond those in the record. I also point out 
that the students will soon see long-arm statutes, like 
New York’s, that explicitly require additional contacts 
in “act without, consequences within” cases.
Preparing the scripts makes every class well-organized. 
The scripts provide an anchor that helps keep the class 
13
firmly on track. The progression of thoughts is very 
specifically planned. I always know what I am going to 
ask next. There are no down periods. I proceed briskly 
for 75 or 100 minutes class9 after class all semester long. 
On the rare occasions when we finish the assigned 
material early and I come to the end of the script I say 
“We finished early. That’s all for today!” Students 
never seem disappointed when that happens.
At the same time, having the script makes me more 
comfortable with elaborations or digressions. When a 
student asks an interesting question, but one that is 
slightly off track, I’m comfortable saying “That’s a 
good question!” or “I’m glad you asked that.” 
Sometimes I just answer the question; more often, I 
turn it back on the class, making up back-up ques-
tions as necessary to lead them to the answer. I know 
the class is not going to end up wandering in the wil-
derness because when the sidetrack comes to an end, I 
can return to the script and ask the next question. 
When a student asks a question that leaps ahead to 
point that I know is coming up later, I say “I want to 
hold that question, we’ll get to it.” And then I always 
do get to it, because it is in the script. I think the 
 students appreciate that their questions don’t get lost 
in the shuffle. It also is not uncommon to have a 
9 I teach a 75 minute class straight through, but usually take a 10 minute 
break in a 100 minute class. Seventy-five minutes seem to go by fairly 
quickly; my energy level remains high and the students seem engaged. 
Without a break, however, the final 25 minutes of a 100 minute class 
seem to drag. With the break, I tell the students to think of class as 
two 50-minute classes. Taking a break also cuts down on students 
leaving during class to go to the bathroom. 
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student ask the question that is the very next question 
in the script. I find this heartening, because it shows 
the student is with me; the student sees where this line 
of questioning is going. I usually say “Good question! 
In fact, that is the very next question in my notes 
here!” That makes the student feel good, and turns 
the question back on the class and we proceed.
The courses I teach involve many different substan-
tive areas of law, and that makes class preparation 
more difficult. In a torts class, every case is a torts 
case; in a contracts class, every case is a contracts case. 
In Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Federal Courts, 
however, we get quite a mix—torts,  contracts, trusts 
and estates, shareholders derivative actions, tax, cor-
porations, labor, and criminal law. In preparing to 
teach a case that involves a substantive area where I 
have little knowledge, I make sure I learn enough to 
understand the facts and the legal arguments. I and 
the students need to know enough about the substan-
tive law to make sure the underlying jurisdictional or 
federalism or evidentiary issue isn’t obscured. 
One venerable Civil Procedure case, for example, 
concerns whether notice by publication of a pending 
judicial settlement of accounts given to beneficiaries 
of small trust estates pooled into a common trust 
fund violates due process.10 The case is a bear and 
there is no way to avoid the details of the formation 
and supervision of common trust funds if the students 
10 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950).
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are to understand what the Supreme Court holds 
about notice. What notice to the beneficiaries is rea-
sonable depends on how their interests are affected by 
the judicial settlement of accounts. Students can 
answer some questions from a careful reading of the 
case; other points I have to tell them. The students 
must be given a basic definition of trust, trustee, and 
beneficiary. Small trusts that cannot afford the 
expenses of capable corporate fiduciaries can band 
together to achieve diversification of risk and econ-
omy of management. Periodically the trustee must 
petition the surrogate’s court for a settlement of 
accounts. One effect of the settlement is to extinguish 
any right of a participating trust or beneficiary to 
challenge the performance of the trustee during the 
accounting period. Thus, if the trustee has violated its 
fiduciary responsibilities, the beneficiaries will lose 
the chance to challenge the violation. Once this basic 
factual and legal structure is clarified, the students 
can understand the Court’s decision about what notice 
of the pending settlement beneficiaries should receive. 
Beneficiaries whose addresses are known must receive 
notice of the proposed settlement by mail; those who 
addresses (or whose identities) are not known can be 
served by publication. Interests are balanced. Trustee 
are not unduly burdened; common trust funds can 
continue to exist; beneficiaries who receive notice 
can act on behalf of those who do not receive notice if 
the situation warrants action. In preparing to teach 
this case and others like it, I do not learn more than 
16
I need to about the substantive law. I also don’t want 
the students to get diverted from the procedural point 
by unnecessary substantive details. 
d
I I I .  COnduCTInG THE Cl ASS
A. PlAyInG SOCrATES
I practice my own version of the Socratic method. 
Like most law professors, I have a seating chart and 
call on people from the chart. Each day I attempt to 
call on people in different parts of the room to keep 
students on their toes. I try to call on enough students 
in each class so that other students will believe there 
is a realistic possibility they might be called on in the 
next class, thus giving the students an extra incentive 
to prepare. When I call on people, I generally ask 
them relatively easy, straight-forward questions that 
someone who has read the case should be able to 
answer. When teaching Gray, for example, I call on 
students for the facts, the wording of the long-arm 
statute, and the two issues listed by the court. I call 
on students who don’t usually participate in class dis-
cussion. I hope they will be able to answer correctly 
and will be encouraged to participate further as the 
class progresses. The students often do participate 
further, although the participation usually does not 
carry over to subsequent classes. 
If student says “I’m unprepared,” I simply ask another 
student the question. The unprepared student is already 
17
mortified and there is no need to linger and add to the 
distress. (I do make a point, however, of calling on 
the unprepared student in the next class.) I generally 
move next to the students immediately around the 
unprepared student. I hope when that pattern becomes 
clear, the surrounding students will be ready when I 
call on one of them and the class can move along. If a 
student does not say “unprepared,” but is nonetheless 
struggling to answer, I wait a little while, but not too 
long, before moving to another student. At that point 
the first student is almost always staring intently at 
the textbook, trying to find the answer. I want to give 
the student a fair chance to answer—to find the text 
of the long-arm statute or read the two issues listed 
by the court. But if I wait too long, the student usu-
ally freezes up. The student is embarrassed and can’t 
think. The rest of the class becomes tense and feels 
sorry for the student, saying to themselves “That 
could be me!” There is no point in asking back-up 
questions because the main question is usually factual 
and straightforward—“What relief does the plaintiff 
seek?” “What are the words of the statute?” The 
 better course, I think, is to move to another student. 
For all but the easy questions, I ask the group and 
take volunteers. In Gray, for example, I ask the class 
“What does the defendant contend on issue No. 1?” 
(The defendant contends the tort took place in Ohio, 
where the valve was manufactured.) I could call on an 
individual to answer that question, but I know many 
students won’t be able to answer it. If the volunteer 
18
appears to know the answer but does not articulate 
the answer clearly or fully, I often say, “Yes, but could 
you explain more fully?” or “Could you elaborate?” 
After the student elaborates, I almost always repeat 
the answer, for two reasons. I say it better, and the 
whole class can hear me. Unless the volunteer is one 
of those rare students who speaks in a loud, clear, 
booming voice, only a small portion of the class has 
heard the student’s answer. 
When a volunteer gives an incorrect or incomplete 
answer to a question and back-up questions are appro-
priate, traditional practice is to stay with that student 
and ask the back-up  questions, leading the student 
eventually to the correct answer. I rarely do that. I 
gently say “No, that’s not quite right” or “That’s a 
good point (or an interesting point), but not quite 
what the defendant is arguing.” I then call on another 
volunteer. If the second or third volunteer doesn’t 
answer correctly, I begin asking back-up questions, 
again to the entire group. Usually, as a group, the 
class can answer the back-up questions and someone 
articulates the correct answer to the main question. 
Sometimes I will stay with the first student, usually 
when the student has given a partially correct answer 
and I think the student can complete the answer. 
For example, if I ask “What does the defendant 
 contend on issue No. 1?” and the student responds 
“The tort did not take place in Illinois.” I will ask the 
same student “Where does the defendant contend 
the tort took place? Why?” Generally, however, if 
19
a student gives an incorrect answer I turn to the 
group for the answer.
I look to the group instead of staying with an 
 individual student for several reasons. First, I’ve 
found that if a student give a wrong answer to the 
main question, the student usually can’t answer 
the back-up questions successfully. Perhaps if we were 
in my office one-on-one, the student could answer 
the back-up questions. With 100 fellow students 
 looking on,  however, most students get that deer-in-
the-headlights look and freeze. If I stay with 
that student, asking question after question without 
a coherent response, the student gets upset and the 
class gets upset. Second, leading one student through 
a series of questions, even if partly successful, often 
is like  pulling teeth. It is slow going. There are 
long pauses. The atmosphere of the class changes 
as the pace changes. The rest of the class go from 
 participating to observing. Third, there are many 
countervailing positive benefits to making question-
answering a group effort. When the class is going 
well, most people are participating, either actively 
by volunteering or at least trying to answer the 
 questions in their minds. The pace is brisk. When 
a student answers incorrectly, I call on another very 
quickly. There is no penalty for a wrong answer. The 
 student is not separated or isolated. The class is 
 working together to answer the question. The stu-
dents are cooperating, not competing. As individuals, 
most of the students can’t answer most of the 
20
questions. As a group, they can answer almost all of 
them. The group is successful. The class is fast-paced, 
upbeat, positive.
There are pitfalls in this approach that I try to avoid. 
A group approach is most successful when a lot of 
students  participate. If the same eight people answer 
all the questions, the rest of group become observers. 
If not enough people  volunteer, I begin calling on 
more people with the in-between questions that I 
could ask an individual or the group. I will say, “Let’s 
get more people involved here, “and ask a back-up 
question that may get more hands in the air. I also 
must be careful not to jump away from a volunteer 
too quickly. The first sentence out of the student’s 
mouth may be a bit garbled or fragmentary; the 
 student actually may know the answer and be able to 
state it if given a few more seconds. In addition, if the 
class gets going too fast, students become confused. 
They get lost. After a sequence of group answers to 
questions and back up questions, I restate. In large 
classrooms, students always have trouble hearing, and 
rapid or partial student answers are hard to follow. 
I’ll say, “Did everybody get that point?” “The court 
is saying there isn’t actually a tort or a  tortious act 
unless a person is injured. The tort isn’t complete. 
Therefore, the court concludes the tort occurred 
in Illinois because that is where Phyllis Gray was 
injured.” My restatement pauses the class, and, 
 hopefully, ensures that almost everyone understands 
the court’s reasoning. Then, I proceed with more 
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questions and back-up questions to the group and 
we move ahead briskly until the next pause 
and restatement.
A final problem with calling on volunteers is that 
some  students repeatedly volunteer but rarely provide 
a correct answer. As a semester proceeds, it quickly 
becomes clear which students fit into this group. 
In the worst cases, other students roll their eyes or 
almost audibly groan when I call on students in 
this group. I deal with this situation by rarely calling 
on the problem students. I call on them occasionally 
so they won’t feel completely marginalized. I usually 
call on them to answer relatively easy questions to 
increase the chances they will give a correct answer. 
Most classes seem comfortable with this  practice. I 
think most of the other students understand exactly 
what I’m doing. 
B. AnSWErInG STudEnT QuESTIOnS
Some students ask terrific questions that are interest-
ing,  insightful, and give me an opportunity to explain 
an important point more fully or to expound on a 
related point. Other  students raise their hands when 
they don’t understand what I’ve just said. If the stu-
dent is a good student and he doesn’t  understand, 
chances are good that many other students also don’t 
understand, so the question tells me I should restate 
the point or explain more fully.
On the other hand, I have learned there are some points 
I should not explain too many times because my 
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explanation seems to become less coherent with each 
repetition. For  example, in World-Wide Volkswagen 
v. Woodson,11 the Supreme Court redefined “foresee-
ability” for personal jurisdiction purposes. To be subject 
to jurisdiction, a manufacturer must foresee being 
haled into court in the forum state, not merely foresee 
that their product might reach the forum state. A 
manufacturer should foresee being haled into court if 
their product reaches the forum state in the stream of 
commerce (which seems to mean the wholesale chain 
of distribution), but not if the product reaches the 
state by the unilateral actions of a consumer bringing 
it there after purchasing the product somewhere else. 
In World-Wide, an allegedly defective Audi automo-
bile left the stream of commerce when the plaintiffs 
purchased it in New York. The plaintiffs subsequently 
drove the car to Oklahoma, where an accident 
occurred. The New York retailer and the New York, 
New Jersey, and Connecticut distributor of Audis did 
no direct business in Oklahoma. Since the plaintiffs’ 
car reached the forum state through the plaintiffs’ 
actions and not in the stream of commerce, the Court 
held there was no jurisdiction in Oklahoma over these 
parties. Students have trouble understanding this redef-
inition of foreseeability, particularly when different 
factual examples are presented. For reasons I don’t 
fully understand, if I try to explain the redefinition 
too many times, confusion grows rather than lessens. 
So I explain it twice and then stop. 
11 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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Unfortunately, some students ask questions that are 
only marginally relevant or don’t make much sense. 
As with  problem volunteers, these students make them-
selves known fairly quickly, and I call on them only 
occasionally. In my introductory remarks in the first 
class, I encourage students to ask  questions, but I also 
say: “I will answer as many questions as I can. If you 
have your hand raised and I don’t call on you, don’t 
take it personally. I often can’t answer all of the ques-
tions from a group this size. When I pass you over, it 
simply reflects my judgment that it is time to move on 
so we can cover the assigned material for the day.” 
I’m speaking truthfully when I say this, but the dis-
claimer also provides a convenient cover for passing 
over students who don’t ask good questions.
Sometimes a student asks a question and I don’t 
know the answer. This situation arises more than I 
might like because, as I explained above, many of the 
courses I teach involve so many different substantive 
areas of law. Particularly in Civil Procedure, students 
ask questions about the substantive law or other issues 
that are simply not relevant to the procedural issues at 
hand. It is important to slip such questions quickly 
and get back on track so the class is not diverted from 
the relevant points or confused. In Pennoyer v. Neff,12 
the granddaddy of all jurisdiction cases, for example, 
Mitchell sued Neff in an Oregon state court for breach 
of contract. Neff was served by publication, never got 
notice, and a default judgment was entered against 
12 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).
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him. When Neff subsequently acquired some real 
property in Oregon, Mitchell had the property sold at 
auction to satisfy the judgment. The point of the case 
is that Oregon had neither personal jurisdiction over 
Neff under existing standards nor jurisdiction quasi-
in-rem because Neff didn’t own the land until after 
judgment was entered. Students often ask questions 
about the auction process—How was the land seized? 
How did the auction work? Since the land was worth 
more than the judgment, what happened to the excess? 
and so on. I, of course, don’t know the procedures for 
enforcement of judgments in Oregon in the 1860s. I 
generally say, “I don’t really know, and I don’t want 
to get into those questions because they will divert us 
from the central points in this case.”
When students ask questions about substantive 
areas of law where I know little, I don’t hesitate to say 
I don’t know. There is nothing wrong with signaling 
students that I’m not a walking encyclopedia of legal 
doctrine. (Indeed, I sum up my knowledge of the 
world as follows: I know a lot about a few things, a 
little bit about a few more things, and absolutely noth-
ing about everything else.) I often leaven the “I don’t 
know” with humor. I make comments like “When I 
took torts back in 1910. . . ,” or “We have now 
exhausted my knowledge of federal labor law.” 
When a student asks a relevant question and I think I 
know the answer, I answer it. That sounds straightfor-
ward, but there can be peril. Sometimes when I am part 
way through confidently laying out the rules on some 
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subject, a little alarm will go off in my head and a 
voice will say, “Don, those might be the rules. That 
would be a good set of rules. Perhaps those should be 
the rules. But you don’t actually know if those are the 
rules.” At that point I begin to backtrack. I usually 
end by saying “I think that’s the right answer, but I 
will check it out.” I generally write myself a quick note 
in class so I don’t forget the question. It is important to 
follow up, find the answer, and report back. Finding 
the answer—or finding there is no answer or that the 
answer is very complicated—usually doesn’t take long. 
I start with the simplest method of legal research—ask 
somebody who knows. A colleague can almost always 
give me the answer or enough information to make 
some intelligent comments on the question next class.
C. SETTInG THE TOnE
The general tone of the class is set largely by the 
mechanics of my question and answer format and my 
version of the Socratic method. The pace is brisk; 
when the class is going well the  students are engaged 
in the group effort of answering the questions and 
understanding the material. Students, I think, do not 
feel much tension or stress; they don’t feel threatened 
or in danger of being humiliated. The atmosphere is 
friendly, but business-like, professional. The class is 
not overly formal, nor is it informal. While I try to 
adopt a friendly demeanor, I am careful to maintain 
a certain distance. I’m not their friend; I’m their 
 professor. I call students by their last names. Almost 
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 paradoxically, because each class is well-planned and 
I’m so clearly in charge, I can be fairly relaxed. I’m 
not tense, I’m not worried or uptight. Students aren’t 
trying to challenge me or put me on the defensive. At 
base, careful preparation is  essential to achieve a good 
classroom atmosphere.
As the semester moves on, I regularly attempt to 
lighten the mood. I usually wait several weeks until 
I’m sure I’ve “got them,” the class patterns are set, 
and the atmosphere is good. I begin by making what I 
hope are humorous asides, perhaps making fun of the 
facts of a case, or telling a brief joke that relates to the 
case or subject we are studying. Humor helps keep 
the students alert and engaged. Laughter wakes peo-
ple up. Despite my acting as though the material we 
are discussing is scintillating, students get bored. The 
energy level of the class dips as we fight our way 
through some complex doctrine. Humor, often unex-
pected, helps get the energy level back up. Humor is 
particularly important in night classes. Most of the 
students have worked during the day and they are 
tired. They run on the energy I pour out. Every ten or 
fifteen minutes I try to say something funny or silly to 
keep them awake. 
Jokes don’t always come easy in the classes I teach, 
except perhaps for Evidence. A high proportion of 
Evidence cases involve either sex or violence or both. 
This cannot be said of the cases in Civil Procedure or 
Federal Courts. Consequently, if I come up with a 
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funny line or a good joke, I tend to use it year after 
year. There are some pitfalls in repeating jokes. Some 
jokes over time become politically incorrect. Obviously 
I avoid jokes that are off-color or that would offend 
people. The problem is more subtle. A joke that in 
1995 seemed harmless by 2005 may seem not quite 
right in light of evolving social norms. I’ve dropped 
several jokes over the years on these grounds. Jokes 
also become dated. The average day student entering 
law school in the Fall of 2007 was born in 1985 and 
didn’t become marginally sentient until 1993 or 1995. 
I teach a case in Evidence captioned Bill v. Farm 
Bureau Life.13 Mr. Bill’s son hung himself in a neighbor’s 
barn. The insurance company declined to pay on a 
policy insuring the son’s life, claiming the death was a 
suicide, not an accident. For many years one of the TV 
networks has aired a comedy program called Saturday 
Night Live. One of the comedy skits was about a little 
white dough boy called Mr. Bill. Each week Mr. Bill 
would get beaten up or torn apart by some character 
talking in a high squeaky voice. In the course of teach-
ing Bill v. Farm Bureau Life, I would break into a 
high squeaky voice and say “Mr. Bill! Mr. Bill! Your 
son is dead!” This always got a big laugh, as the stu-
dents made the connection to the television show. 
Then, one year, only a few people laughed and every-
one else got a “What is this guy’s problem?” look on 
their faces. It clearly was time to retire that joke!
13 254 Iowa 1215, 119 N.W.2d 768 (1963).
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The most reliable jokes are ones that grow from the 
facts of a case, do not require any outside knowledge, 
and carry no risk of offense. Another Evidence case, 
McAndrews v. Leonard,14 provides a good example. 
Surgeons removed a circular portion of plaintiff’s 
skull to relieve pressure on the brain. The issue at trial 
was whether the tissue that grew over the opening 
was as hard as bone or was a softer substance. The 
appeals court upheld a trial court decision to let the 
jurors probe the substance with their fingers to assess 
how hard it was. While the jurors were not competent 
to assess the substance scientifically, the jurors were 
competent to distinguish between hard and soft. In 
mimicking jurors pushing on the plaintiff’s skull with 
their thumbs, I pretend one of my thumbs plunges 
into the plaintiff’s head. I pull it out with effort and 
hold it up, grimacing as though it is covered with 
blood, and say “Oh, sorry!” This is slapstick; it’s silly. 
But the joke only takes ten seconds and it always has 
the desired effect. It catches students completely by 
surprise; some laugh, some groan and shake their 
heads. Everyone wakes up.
A teacher’s efforts to maintain a positive, professional 
atmosphere can be jeopardized by disruptive students. 
The culprits are almost always a group of young men 
who sit in the back of the class and talk to each other 
a little too often and a little too loudly. I’ve only faced 
this problem a couple of times in my years of teaching. 
14 99 Vt. 512, 134 A. 710 (1926).
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Again, careful preparation, a brisk pace, and being in 
charge help keep students from misbehaving. Being a 
man also helps; my sense is that my female colleagues 
face this problem more often than my male colleagues. 
The best response, I think, is to try to nip the prob-
lem in the bud by calling the students aside after class 
and telling them I find their behavior disruptive and 
distracting and I want them to stop. I must confess, 
however, that the couple of times I faced the problem 
I didn’t talk to the students, seeking to avoid confron-
tation. In one class, my distress soured the tone as the 
semester went on. The irony was that when one of the 
culprits, a very good student it turned out, came to my 
office to talk to me late in the semester and I mentioned 
that the constant talking had bothered me, he was 
mortified. I should have said something early on.
The overall tone of a class is also affected by how 
the professor deals with politics. I am politically 
engaged and have strong feelings on a wide range par-
tisan political issues. I am more a pragmatist than an 
ideologue these days, but my politics are definitely left 
of center, particularly since the center has moved so 
far to the right. Overtly political issues come up most 
often in my Federal Courts class. In area after area, 
the Supreme Court has erected myriad barriers that 
deny litigants any effective relief for violation of their 
constitutional and  statutory rights. I don’t hide my 
views, but I always bring out the  arguments on the 
other side, either in the opinions of the justices or by 
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asking the class, “What’s the argument on the other 
side?” I don’t feel a need to be personally neutral. 
These are not small children whose minds I’m going 
to warp by taking a partisan position. I do want the 
students to know, however, that they are entitled to 
hold and express views contrary to mine. 
In Federal Courts I generally find it more interesting 
to put the overtly political aspects of Supreme Court 
decisions to one side and focus instead on the incon-
sistent or incoherent aspects of the Justices’ opinions. 
Reaching a desired result often entails ignoring or dis-
torting past precedent, relying on faulty logic, ignoring 
reality, or saying things that just don’t make any 
sense. I try to be even-handed in my criticism of these 
 practices, whether the opinion was written by a conser-
vative or a liberal justice. Often decisions have elements 
that do—or should—upset people on both sides of 
the political spectrum. Boyle v. United Technologies15 
is one of my favorite examples of this  phenomenon. 
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, 
and Kennedy. David Boyle, a marine helicopter pilot, 
drowned when his helicopter crashed in the Atlantic 
Ocean during a training exercise. His father brought 
a diversity action in federal district court against 
Sikorsky Helicopter, the manufacturer of the aircraft, 
asserting two claims under Virginia tort law. Mr. Boyle 
won a substantial verdict in the trial court, but the 
15  487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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Fourth Circuit reversed. As to one claim, the Circuit 
held Mr. Boyle had not satisfied one of his burdens 
under Virginia law; as to the other claim, the court 
applied a new federal common law defense for military 
contractors. The elements of the defense are relatively 
easy to satisfy, and the court held Sikorsky had satis-
fied them. The Supreme Court ratified the creation of 
the new defense and affirmed. A clearer example of 
judicial activism is hard to find, and it is an activism 
that offends both separation of powers and federalism 
principles. Congress, rather than the federal courts, 
usually legislates federal right and defenses, and, under 
the Erie doctrine, state law generally governs tort claims 
and defenses. To make matters worse, Congress had 
on six separate occasions declined to enact legislation 
creating a special defense for military contractors.16 
Liberals, who have tended to favor judicial activism 
when they liked the rights and duties being created, 
are brought up short by this decision. Here judicial 
activism is being used to leave Mr. Boyle without any 
remedy for the death of his son due to Sikorsky’s 
shoddy helicopter design. Conservatives face a  similar 
dilemma. While they tend to favor restriction of tort 
remedies and fear any decisions that might interfere 
with the military, these ends are accomplished in 
Boyle by trampling on separation of powers and fed-
eralism principles conservatives purport to hold dear.
16 See id. at 515 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(listing legislation that 
Congress has refused to pass for government contractors).
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d. rESPECTInG THE STudEnTS
On class evaluation forms, my students almost uni-
versally say I am very respectful of them. I think that’s 
true. I never say that in so many words, of course. So 
how do I convey that impression? On reflection, I 
think it happens in a number of ways. Perhaps most 
directly, I try to be pleasant and polite. When  students 
talk to me, I listen. I make eye contact. I try to be 
responsive. I don’t make fun of them when they give 
wrong answers or make strange comments. I don’t act 
bored or detached or as though I would rather be 
someplace else. I also think my careful planning and 
preparation conveys respect. My evaluation forms 
show that students understand that I am well-prepared 
and organized. I’m not wasting their time. Every class 
they are challenged to participate, to engage, and they 
are given important insights into the assigned material. 
The implicit message is that they are worth the effort. 
Along the same line, I always dress up for class. I 
always wear a coat and tie. It is only in recent times 
that I have let myself dress down from a suit to a 
sports jacket and slacks. I was 32 years old my first 
year of teaching. My first class was 120 night stu-
dents, almost all of whom were older than me. I 
dressed up as a defensive measure. I thought that I 
better look like a lawyer. As the years went by I didn’t 
need the suit anymore, but I kept wearing it anyway, 
to signal that the class is important. Teaching is what 
I do. It is important to me. The material is important; 
the students are important.
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I have high expectations of the students, and I think 
that implicitly signals respect. High expectations 
imply the students are smart enough to perform at a 
high level. Some of the material is very difficult. I 
expect them to read carefully. I ask hard questions. 
The group has got to come up with the answer. I think 
high expectations are particularly important at New 
York Law School or at any school that is not at the 
top in the U.S. News survey. Many of our students 
are insecure and have a lot of self doubts. They didn’t 
get straight “A” grades in college. Their LSATs put 
them in the middle of the pack. I imagine many stu-
dents say to themselves, “Here I am at New York Law 
School. Is this place any good? Am I smart enough to 
be a lawyer?” I want the students to understand and 
to believe that this is a real law school class. It’s run 
the way a law school class is supposed to be run. They 
are reading the same textbook that students are read-
ing at Harvard and NYU. I’m asking the same 
questions that are being asked at those schools, and I 
expect NYLS students to answer them. The implicit, 
but clear, message is that I respect them.
d
IV.  Ex AmS
My exams are a mix of objective (multiple choice and 
true false) questions and essay questions. In grading 
the essays, I use a number system. I put numbers in 
the margin as I read, “1s” for statement of legal rules, 
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“2s” and “3s” for points of analysis. When I reach the 
end of the answer, I total the numbers. I use this system 
for two reasons. First, it is difficult to be consistent 
over a period of weeks grading 200 bluebooks. My 
mood changes; I get worn down. I can always tell an 
“A” from a “C”, but can I  reliably distinguish between 
a “B–” and a “C+” on a read through? While using 
numbers hardly makes the grading objective, I do 
think a number system makes grading more consis-
tent. Second, having numbers in the margins suggests 
to students reviewing their exams that I have read the 
exams carefully. I remember as a student being suspi-
cious when a professor wrote “C+” at the top of the 
exam and there was not a mark on it. For the same 
reason, I also try to scribble a few comments or ques-
tions on the weaker exams. When students come to 
review their exams, I talk with them about my gen-
eral impressions based on the numbers and the 
comments, and I send them away with a copy of the 
essay question, their bluebook, and a copy of an “A” 
or “A+” answer. I direct them to reread the question, 
read their answer, read the “A+” and compare and 
contrast the two answers carefully. Most of the stu-
dents see and understand the differences between 
their paper and the “A+.” In my essays I am looking 
for even-handed and thorough analysis. On the one 
hand, on the other hand, and in great detail. Weak 
exams don’t argue from both sides and are conclusory. 
I doubt that comparing their exam with an “A+” 
 actually teaches the weaker students how to do 
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 even-handed, thorough analysis. But I think most 
 students understand the differences in the paper, 
which makes the weaker students more content with 
their lower grade. 
d
V. BE InG “ In THE flOW”
Being “in the flow” while I teach has several distinct 
characteristics. I am totally focused on the class and 
am not conscious of my self. Time passes differently 
than it passes ordinarily. I feel very strong. I feel 
 creative. When a class is going particularly well, I 
feel a deep sense of satisfaction.
In my daily life, I am not particularly good at focus-
ing or concentrating on a single subject or task. I 
function; I can plant my tomatoes or write this para-
graph. But my thoughts tend to jump around, from 
one subject to another. I’ve never been good at medi-
tation. I can’t clear my mind of all thoughts or 
concentrate on one single object for more than ten or 
fifteen seconds. When I teach, by contrast, I concen-
trate solely on the subject we are discussing and on 
the interaction with the  students. My mind does not 
jump around to the myriad other matters that crowd 
my mind normally. I don’t watch myself teach. I just 
do it. It that sense I am not self-conscious when I 
teach. As Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi puts it:
[L]oss of self-consciousness does not involve loss 
of self, and certainly not a loss of consciousness, 
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but rather, only a loss of consciousness of the self. 
What slips below the threshold of awareness is the 
concept of self, the information we use to represent 
to ourselves who we are. And being able to forget 
temporarily who we are seems to be very enjoy-
able. When not preoccupied with ourselves, we 
actually have a chance to expand the concept of 
who we are.17
Time passes differently than it does ordinarily. It goes 
by very fast. I’m not unaware of time when I teach. 
My classrooms have a large, easily readable clock on 
the wall. I need to be aware how much time I am 
spending on a topic so I don’t fall behind. But I am 
always a bit surprised when I realize 30 or 40 minutes 
have gone by in what seems like no time at all.
I feel strong when I teach. I am neither bored nor 
anxious. I feel secure; not threatened. My classes have 
clear goals. Once the semester gets going, the ground 
rules are clear. I am able to meet the challenges I will 
face in the class, and as a group, the students are able 
to meet the challenges they face. In my daily life I feel 
strong sometimes, weak other times. Like everyone I 
have my insecurities and vulnerabilities. But in class, I 
feel strong.
I often feel creative in class. I believe this is possible 
because class is interactive. Even though I am teach-
ing a case or topic that I have taught many times, the 
student answers to my questions are different each 
17 Csikszentmihalyi, supra n. 1, at 64. 
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time. Exactly what back-up questions are appropriate 
depends on how the students have responded to the 
main question. I also do quite a lot of spontaneous 
Q&A, either in response to student questions or to 
try to drive points home when it is clear the class does 
not fully understand the material. These new 
exchanges with students emulate the Q&A in the 
script, but because they are spontaneous, I am creat-
ing as I go.
I have a sense of well-being when I teach. I believe 
what I am doing has real worth. I’m the center of 
attention. I can tell that the students appreciate my 
teaching, which of course makes me feel good. Who 
doesn’t like to be liked? I feel a deep sense of 
satisfaction. 
d
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APPEndIx 
CIVIl PrOCEdurE
ClASS # 5
InTrOduCTIOn
We have been tracing the doctrinal evolution of 
 jurisdictional basis. In 1945 in International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, the Supreme Court made some major 
changes in the relatively rigid Pennoyer framework by 
adopting the so-called minimum contacts test. This 
test requires that to subject a non-resident individual 
or corporation to suit, the defendant must have cer-
tain minimum contacts with the forum such that the 
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice. The new test is qualitative, 
not quantitative. It does not depend merely upon 
 adding up the contacts in a mechanical way. Rather, 
it involves weighing and analyzing the nature and 
quality of the non-resident defendant’s relationship 
with the forum to determine whether it is fair and 
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reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Shoe also suggests that in applying the test, courts 
should assess whether the defendant has purposefully 
conducted activities in forum, thus availing himself of 
the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum.
Shoe also suggested a series of rough categories to 
use as a starting point for analysis. If the non-resident 
is involved in systematic and continuous activity 
within the forum, and the cause of action arises from 
that activity, it is almost always reasonable for a court 
to exercise jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the non-
resident commits only an isolated act or conducts only 
occasional business in the forum, and the cause of action 
is unrelated to that activity, courts generally should 
not exercise jurisdiction. In the middle categories—
the defendant conducts systematic and continuous 
activity in the forum but the cause of action is 
 unrelated to that activity, and the defendant conducts 
sporadic or isolated activity in the forum but the 
cause of action arises from the activity—courts will 
sometimes exercise jurisdiction and sometimes not.
Today we begin our discussion of state long-arm 
statutes. As the brief discussion in the text makes 
clear, legislatures as well as courts get involved 
in defining the circumstances in which courts 
may  properly exercise jurisdiction. The United States 
Supreme Court sets the constitutional limits. The 
states, through their legislatures and courts, then 
define the circumstances under which the courts 
of the state may exercise jurisdiction, within 
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constitutional limits. The name “long-arm statute” is 
based on the idea that the statute extends a court’s 
jurisdiction. The court reaches its long arm out across 
the country, grabs a defendant, and brings him back 
to the forum. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, many state legislatures 
enacted long-arm statutes, seeking to take advantage 
of the expanded personal jurisdiction allowed by 
International Shoe. The original long-arm statutes 
were an elaboration on one of the Shoe categories. 
The statutes applied in cases where the defendant 
committed a single act—or only isolated activity—in 
the forum, but the cause of action arose from that 
activity. This category is one of the in-between 
 categories where jurisdiction is only sometimes 
allowed. Legislatures sought to differentiate between 
the “yes” and “no.” Some legislatures wrote very 
lengthy  statutes that sought to specify all of the 
 different kinds of cases where jurisdiction would be 
allowed. Other  legis latures, wanting to maximize 
state jurisdiction, simply said jurisdiction should be 
exercised in any case where it does not exceed 
federal constitutional limits. A third group of states, 
like Illinois and New York, took a middle approach. 
They wrote  statutes that gave some general guidance 
in major categories of cases, such as tort cases and 
contract cases. Gray v. American Radiator is a 1961 
case involving the Illinois long-arm statute. It is very 
helpful in introducing you to the kind of issues that 
arise under the middle group of long-arm statutes.
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Gray v. american radiator P. 83
What are the facts of Gray? 
(Titan Valve manufactured a valve in Ohio. American 
Radiator incorporated the valve into a water heater in 
Pennsylvania. In the course of commerce, the water 
heater was sold in Illinois to Phyllis Gray, where it 
exploded, injuring her. Ms. Gray sued Titan Valve for 
damages in the Illinois Circuit Court—a trial court—
which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The 
trial court also dismissed the crossclaim of American 
Radiator against Titan, which left American Radiator 
and “others” as the defend ants. American Radiator 
had filed the crossclaim against Titan seeking indem-
nification by Titan if it was found liable because Titan 
had made certain warranties to American Radiator. 
Plaintiff Gray appealed the dismissal as to Titan. The 
Illinois Supreme Court said that because a constitu-
tional issue was involved, the  plaintiff was correct to 
appeal directly to the Supreme Court instead of going 
first to an  intermediate appellate court.)
Extra:
— Who were the parties to the lawsuit? Where was 
each located?
— Where did the valve start out? How did it get 
to Illinois?
— What was American Radiator’s position in all of this?
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— What does American Radiator mean when it claims 
it should be indemnified by Titan? [Note: Put states 
and parties on board:   
Gray—IL Titan—OH American Radiator—PA 
and put an arrow from OH to PA and from PA to IL] 
The plaintiff is suing under the Illinois long-arm statute. 
What is the key language of the statute that the 
plaintiff says authorizes jurisdiction? 
(Section 17(b)(1) of the statute says that a nonresident 
who, either in person or through an agent, commits a 
tortious act within the State submits to jurisdiction.)
What does the Court identify as the issues in the case? 
(Page 83, bottom: “The questions in this case are (1) 
whether a tortious act was committed here, within 
the meaning of the statute, despite the fact that Titan 
corporation has no agent in  Illinois; and (2) whether 
the statute, if so construed, violates due process.”)
 What does the defendant contend as to issue No. 1? 
(1) the wrong occurred in the place of manufacture, 
which is Ohio. Only the consequences took place in 
Illinois; and (2) “tortious act” refers only to the act or 
conduct, separate and apart from any consequences.
Extra:
— How does Titan interpret the phrase “tortious act?”
— Where did the tort occur according to Titan? Why?
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What does the court hold on issue No. 1? Why?
(The tortious act took place in Illinois (1) because the 
consequences occurred here; namely, the water heater 
exploded here. Court says on page 84, “To be tortious 
an act must cause injury.” Thus, without the injury, no 
tortious act. (2) the statute of limitations runs from the 
time the injury occurs, from which we can infer that 
the tort occurs at the time of injury.)
Extra:
— Where did the tort or tortious act occur, according to 
the court?
— How do we know the tort occurred in Illinois?
— Why is the court talking about the statute of 
limitations?
— What is a statute of limitations? (A statute that 
specifies how long a person has to sue.)
— How is the statute of limitations relevant to when 
the tort occurred? (Statute runs from when the 
injury occurs, not from the time of negligent manu-
facture. From this the court infers the tort occurs at 
the time of injury.)
What is the defendant’s contention as to issue No. 2? 
How or why would holding Titan subject to jurisdiction 
under the Illinois long-arm statute violate due process? 
(Basically, Titan says it lacks sufficient contacts with 
Illinois to make assertion of jurisdiction over it 
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reasonable under the Shoe test. Titan says its only 
contact with Illinois is that its valve happened to end 
up in Illinois after passing through Pennsylvania. 
There is no proof that Titan has ever done any other 
business in Illinois, directly or indirectly.)
Extra:
— What exactly is the extent of Titan’s contact with 
Illinois, according to the proof submitted in this case?
— Assume you are the lawyer for Titan: How would 
you use International Shoe to argue for dismissal?
What is the court’s response to this argument? 
(No due  process violation).
Why not? 
The court says, middle page 85:
We do not think, however, that doing a given 
volume of business is the only way in which a 
nonresident can form the required connection 
with this State. Since the International Shoe 
case was decided the requirements for jurisdic-
tion have been further relaxed, so that at the 
present time it is sufficient if the act or trans-
action itself has a substantial connection with 
the State of the forum.
Extra:
— What does the court say has happened to the law 
governing jurisdiction since Shoe was decided?
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So, the court concludes that we have a tortious act 
within the state within the meaning of the state long-arm 
statute, and that exercising jurisdiction on the facts of 
this case does not violate constitutional standards.
Now, you will notice that the court took about two 
pages to conduct this analysis and decide that juris-
diction exists. But the opinion continues for another 
two-and-a-half pages. The court has decided the case. 
Why does it continue to write? Why doesn’t the opin-
ion just end? Sometimes, of course, opinions go on 
and on because judges are long-winded. It is not as 
though there is an official court editor that comes into 
chambers and says “Judge, this is too long. Shorten 
it.” But I think something else is going on here, that 
there are other reasons why the court keeps on going, 
and I would like to explore those reasons now.
The court turns to precedent, mentioning several cases, 
including its own prior case, Nelson v. Miller. I want to 
examine Nelson now, and see if it is really on point.
What are the facts of Nelson? 
(Defendant, a Wisconsin resident, sold appliances. In 
the course of delivering a stove in Illinois, an employee 
of the defendant was involved in an accident with the 
plaintiff and negligently caused the plaintiff injury.)
How are those facts different from the Gray facts? 
(In Gray, no agent or employee of Titan delivered the 
stove into  Illinois. In Gray, the negligent act occurred 
outside Illinois, and only the consequences, the injury, 
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occurred in Illinois. In Nelson, the negligent act and 
the injury both occurred in Illinois. The whole tort 
occurred in Illinois, lock, stock, and barrel.)
Extra:
Focus on the disagreement between the parties in Gray 
as to where the tortious act occurred.
— Could the defendant in Nelson make the same 
argument that the defendant made in Gray about 
the tortious act occurring outside Illiniois?
—Why not?
Which case, Nelson or Gray, involves greater contact 
between the defendant and Illinois? 
(Nelson, clearly, because the defendant’s agent came 
into the state and while here did the negligent act that 
hurt the plaintiff. In Gray, no agent of Titan came 
into the state. Titan did whatever it did wrong in 
Ohio, and then sent the valve off to Pennsylvania.)
In which case, Nelson or Gray, did the defendant do 
more to purposely avail itself of the benefits and pro-
tections of the laws of Illinois? 
(In Nelson, clearly. The defendant knowingly and 
purposely sent his agent into Illinois with a stove. In 
Gray, Titan only sent a valve to Pennsylvania, maybe 
knowing its valve might end up in Illinois or not.)
Extra:
—Focus on the word “purposely.”
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Note: The court also cites Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Corp., a Vermont case we discussed ear-
lier. As a precedent, Smyth poses the same problems 
as Nelson. In Smyth, remember, plaintiff, who lived in 
Vermont, sued a nonresident roofer a defective roof-
ing job on his home in Vermont. Thus, in Smyth, as in 
Nelson, both the negligent act and the consequences 
occurred in the forum.
So, we have an interesting situation here. The court 
is relying on precedents that are clearly distinguish-
able from the case before it. And the court does not 
explicitly acknowledge the differences between Nelson 
and Smyth, on the one hand, and Gray on the other. 
Nonetheless, I think the court actually does see the 
differences and recognizes that there are a lot more 
contacts in Nelson and Smyth than in Gray, and I 
think the court is concerned about the differences. 
Why do I think that? Well, let me draw your atten-
tion to the top of page 87.
What does the court do in the first paragraph on 
page 87? 
(The court presumes that a lot of Titan valves end up in 
Illinois, and from that the court concludes Titan enjoys 
the benefits of the Illinois market. It also presumes 
Titan knows that some of its valves put in water heat-
ers in Pennsylvania will end up in Illinois.)
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Extra:
— What did the record show about the volume of Titan’s 
business or where appliances containing Titan valves 
are marketed? (Nothing)
— So what does the court do about that deficiency 
in the record, or deficiency in plaintiff’s proof? 
(It makes facts up. The court says “It is a reason-
able inference that [Titan’s] commercial transactions, 
like those of other manufacturers, result in sub-
stantial use and consumption in this state.”
— And what does the court then infer from those made 
up facts?
Note: The normal rule is that an appellate court is 
 restricted in deciding an appeal to the facts that appear 
in the record of the case that it receives from the lower 
court. A party can’t come to the argument before the 
Illinois Supreme Court and say, “Judges, I’m sorry, but 
I have some additional evidence I forgot to introduce 
in the trial court and I would like to introduce it now.” 
And appellate judges are surely not supposed to say, 
“Oh, there are some facts missing that I wish were 
in the record so I’ll just make them up.” Nonetheless, 
that is what the court does in the Gray case. 
The court takes this unusual step, I believe, because 
it realizes there is a difference between cases where 
the entire tort, negligent act and consequences, occurs 
in the forum state, and cases where the negligent act 
occurs outside the state and only the consequences 
occur in the forum. Generally, cases where the act 
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occurs outside and only the injury happens inside will 
involve many fewer contacts with the forum by the 
defendant than when both act and consequences occur 
inside the forum. The court in Gray seems comfortable 
saying jurisdiction exists in “act without, consequences 
within” cases only when there are some significant 
additional contacts between the nonresident defen-
dant and the forum. As you will see, later cases and 
state long-arm statutes pick up on this point and allow 
jurisdiction in “act without, consequences within” 
cases only when such additional contacts exist.
The court ends by citing several other factors that 
make assertion of jurisdiction in Illinois reasonable.
What are those factors? 
(Illinois plaintiff suffered the injury; Illinois law will 
govern the  substantive tort issues as a matter of hori-
zontal choice of law; Illinois the most convenient 
forum since  witnesses and other proof likely to be 
located in Illinois.) 
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